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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20536



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services



FILE:

Office: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Date:

APR 0 7 2004

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(i) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION**: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having sought to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact on December 24, 1993. He is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and his stepchildren.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. See District Director Decision dated March 21, 2000. The decision was remanded to the District Director by the AAO on March 7, 2001, to adjudicate an Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212). On July 24, 2003 the Interim District Director forwarded the record of proceedings to the AAO as the applicant had not filed a Form I-212. The AAO finds that the Interim District Director is correct in remanding the appeal to this office and the AAO will adjudicate the appeal of the district director's denial of the Form I-601.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act regarding fraud and misrepresentation and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects, and the applicant admitted under oath, that on December 24, 1993, he used a passport that did not belong to him in order to gain admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact. After it was discovered that the applicant was using a passport

that did not belong to him, he continued to willfully misrepresent himself and did not reveal his true name to the immigration inspector. The applicant was placed into exclusion proceedings and on October 11, 1995 an Immigration Judge found him excludable from the United States and the applicant was ordered excluded and deported in absentia. The applicant continued to falsely misrepresent himself in order to gain benefits under the Act by applying for an employment authorization document in 1994.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse.

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel states that Citizen and Immigration Services, (CIS) failed to correctly assess that extreme hardship would be imposed upon the applicant's spouse (Ms. and his two stepchildren. In support of this assertion, counsel submits a brief and affidavits from Ms. and his two stepchildren. In the brief counsel states that Ms. would suffer emotionally and financially if her spouse's waiver application was not approved. In the brief counsel states that it would be unreasonable for Ms. relocate to Ghana in order to join her husband because she would lose contact with her sisters and mother who reside in the United States.

There are no laws that require Ms. Rogers, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more that to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

Additionally, in the brief counsel states that if the applicant's stepchildren were to relocate to Ghana with the applicant they would suffer from extreme racial prejudice and ongoing civil war, they would be deprived educational and health care opportunities, and may be exposed to diseases and language barriers.

As mentioned, section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident *spouse or parent* of such alien. Congress specifically

did not mention extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident child or stepchild. Counsel's assertions regarding the hardship the applicant's stepchildren would suffer will thus not be considered.

The assertion of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to § 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 213a, the person who files an application for an immigration visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable on behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support on behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.